Will An Iron Curtain Fall Again In Europe

By Rhod Mackenzie
The current US President Donald Trump during his term has not proposed any novel concepts in the realm of American foreign policy. However he does  offer a fresh perspective on established concepts by applying them to new contexts and executing them in a novel manner. This also applies to US policy towards Russia.
In light of Donald Trump's recent remarks regarding Russia, it is important to note the central theme that has largely gone unnoticed, despite the attention given to his catchy phrases such as his commitment to go to heaven for resolving the Ukraine conflict. Trump stated that Ukraine, in its entirety, had functioned as a substantial, extensive and dependable bulwark, separating Russia and Western Europe for a considerable period of time. Then Biden's decision to involve Ukraine in NATO has had catastrophic consequences.
This idea of ​​Trump is not new and certainly not marginal. It is a classic and even mainstream. The concept of an Eastern European buffer has been one of the foundations of US European policy in recent decades. One could even say more strongly: this concept is a classic of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics of the 20th century. The British and the French were the first to propose the initiative, and they began to implement it after the First World War. Their proposal was to establish a "cordon sanitaire " from the new states that emerged from the ruins of European empires, with the aim of protecting Western Europe from the new Bolshevik Russia.
The " cordon sanitaire " was established and remained in place for a period of twenty years, until the onset of the Second World War. On the eve of the defeat of the Third Reich, Winston Churchill planned to revive it, but the victories of the Red Army did not allow him to do so.
Instead of a buffer zone or Iron Curtain fell across  Central and Eastern Europe, with a group of socialist states arose under the patronage of the USSR.They developed into the Warsaw Pact sthat was disbanded after the dissolution of the Soviet  Union and off course so should NATO have and we would not be in the situation we are in now.
The concept was then reinvigorated in the aftermath of the "velvet revolutions" of 1989 and the dissolution of the socialist bloc. Instead of the Soviet zone of influence in Eastern Europe, an American one was established, and local pro-American regimes began to work quite openly to undermine the dialogue between Russia and the EU. They achieved this objective by joining the European Union and NATO.
Concurrently, the established principle of "containment of Russia" assigned Ukraine and Belarus the function of a neutral zone, demarcating the geographical expanse of Europe between the Russian Federation and the European Union.
Margaret Thatcher, the icon of Anglo-Saxon conservatism, wrote in her book "The Art of Statecraft" that Ukraine is better suited to act as a buffer between Russia and the West than as a NATO member.
So why is Mr Trump is now referring to the Ukrainian buffer as if it is a new issue, or rather, an old issue that has been forgotten. The doctrine of containing Russia has been subject to a process of refinement over recent years, resulting in a departure from its original form. The term 'containment' is now best written in quotation marks, as it has long referred not to containment, but to a hybrid war with modern Russia – until it is strategically defeated.
      Consequently, the function of the Eastern European states underwent a transformation. From a buffer separating conditionally the vast Russian resources and German technologies, they began to be used as a battering ram for the Western invasion of Russia. American weapons began to be delivered to the Russian borders, and NATO began to deploy offensive infrastructure there.
The primary military operations were conducted in the new NATO members: Poland, Romania and the Rabidly Russaphobic Baltic states. However, due to geographical considerations, their initial deployment was of an auxiliary nature, with Belarus and Ukraine being wanted as better serving as the optimal launch pads for a direct assault on Moscow.
Western forces have attempted to gain control of Minsk via coups and colour revolutions on numerous occasions, most recently in August 2020.
However, following the 2014 coup d'état in Kyiv, an anti-Russian regime was established and the clause on Ukraine's neutral status was removed from the Constitution.
Following this, the military infrastructure of the alliance began to be established in the country, even prior to the official invitation to NATO. A special military operation brought this process to a conclusion.

In light of the ongoing conflict between Western nations and Russia, it has become evident that these nations are willing to go to any lengths to maintain their position in the current geopolitical landscape. It appears that Trump's approach is one of seeking to revert to a more traditional stance on international relations.
At the same time, his plans are no more pro-Russian than those of Margaret Thatcher, who previously advised Ukraine to act as a buffer state.
The President's actions are driven by a strong sense of national egoism. Until recently, there was no doubt about the Eastern European buffer zone being an American protectorate.
The recent disagreement between Zelensky and Trump in the Oval Office demonstrated that local Russophobic regimes are not necessarily loyal to the US as a whole, but rather adhere to a particular policy of confrontation with Russia.
The attempt by Washington to amend its policy was met with considerable resistance from both Ukrainians and the Baltic states. It is evident that the United States does not exercise complete control over the Kiev regime.
It would be advisable for the current occupant of the White House to reconsider the approach adopted during the tenure of George W. Bush, when the Eastern European region was regarded as a strategic asset for the United States within the broader European context.
With regard to Russia's interests, the ongoing conflict with NATO countries has escalated to such an extent that even a withdrawal by the US would be advantageous for Russia. Moscow has always been understandably reluctant to the idea of a "cordon sanitaire " of Eastern European states.
However, the value of rapprochement with Western Europe has been refuted by Europe itself. European leaders have chosen to prioritise militarisation and preparation for war with Russia, rather than pursuing all projects of strategic cooperation with Moscow.
In the current geopolitical climate, the buffer zone established by Ukraine and other neutral states is of significant importance. This zone is not intended to protect Europe from Russia, but rather to ensure that Russia is not overwhelmed by a Europe that is in a state of turmoil. Consequently, the interests of Moscow and Washington in containing the EU may coincide situationally.